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Court) to choose between two parts of its own soulbetween liberal multiculturalism on the one hand and
liberal religious neutralism on the other.
With Jacobsohn's help we see how vastly different
such questions appear when considered from the perspective of Israeli constitutionalism, which he calls an
"alternative pluralism." In the U.S., pluralism is said to
require the state (and its schools) to be scrupulously
neutral among rival sub-communities and their values.
In Israel, pluralism requires the state to accommodateand empower-the cultural institutions of various religious sub-communities, even while it publicly affirms
the centrally Jewish identity of the polity as a whole. The
American rule of religious neutralism, if transplanted
unmodified, would shatter the identity of the Jewish
state, and would be regarded by most Israelis (Jew and
Arab alike) as a homogenizing doctrine corrosive of the
actually existing plurality of communities. Americans
may find such thinking incongruous. But in a brilliant
move of internal comparison, Jacobsohn points them to
the one "glaring exception" to America's liberal constitutionalist norms: the native American tribes (p. 18).
Based on early treaties and their claim to primeval
nationhood, the tribes, as communities, enjoy constitutional recognition in a manner more consistent with the
Israeli than the American brand of constitutionalism.
Most revealing was the 1968 "Indian Civil Rights Act,"
opposed by native Americans as an assimilationist instrument whose exaltation of individual rights would
erode tribal cohesion. Jacobsohn notes that the final
version of the Act pointedly omitted any no-establishment-of-religion clause, since the integration of spirituality and public order often constitutes tribal identity. As
Jacobsohn says of Israel, such communal autonomy
"supports political stability by providing non-dominant
(and inassimilable) groups with mechanisms that enable
them to minimize the effects of their inferior position in
the larger society" (p. 35).
Liberal doubters might dismiss the native American
case as a constitutional regime's pragmatic compromise
with a marginal anti-constitutionalist sub-community.
The bigger question, then, is whether such arrangements qualify as a version of constitutionalism when, as
in Israel, they mark the scheme as a whole. Does the
Israeli experience represent its own principled form of
constitutionalism, as Jacobsohn seems to hold, or does it
qualify only to the extent that it conforms to the norms
of American-style individualist liberalism, with deviations regarded as anti-constitutionalist malfeasance?
The State of Israel does not, of course, have a formalized constitutional text; it has an incomplete set of "Basic
Laws" on different subjects passed by the Knesset, and
no list of constitutionally protected individual rights. In
the absence of a definitive document, the 1948 Declaration of Independence has loomed large. Along with the
1950 Law of Return, the Declaration continues to define
the Israeli policy, and under its terms the Israeli Supreme Court has developed a practice of judicial review
that includes substantial protection for individual civil
liberties. Score one for Israel, at least by American
criteria.
Yet Jacobsohn does not gloss over the lack of a text.
Creating a unified text is a daunting task, he explains, in
the face of the tensions which comprise the Israeli polity.
For Israel is constituted by its dual commitmentsannounced in the Declaration-to being a Jewish state
and to ensuring equal rights and freedoms for "all its

inhabitants." Jacobsohn calls this "a mix of universal
and particularistic principles" (p. 237). In several rich
chapters, he examines the political and jurisprudential
consequences of this mixture. He examines the recent
controversy over amendments to the Law of Return
(Who is a Jew?). He shows how the Israeli Court's
dominance has been curtailed by the mix of constitutional principles just as much as by the tradition of
parliamentary supremacy. He reviews education policy,
national security censorship, and free-speech jurisprudence, most intriguingly the Kahane case and the ban on
the showing of the film The Last Temptation of Christ
(banned briefly out of respect for the sensibilities of
Israel's minority Christian community).
Jacobsohn shows how ambiguity characterizes Israeli
jurisprudence in all of these areas. He is far from
portraying Israeli law as consistently communitarian or
illiberal; by his own account the outcomes often match
those of American courts. But with careful attention to
nuance, he demonstrates how, even in those cases
which seem to track most closely with American jurisprudence, there remains among Israeli judges a principled reticence to embrace the liberal view wholesale,
and a consistent recognition that Israel's Jewish identity,
and its fragile cultural context, make it unwise-even
unconstitutional-to replicate the jurisprudence of individual autonomy rights.
In his final chapter, Jacobsohn broods on the theoretical implications of his comparison. He struggles to
articulate the meaning of constitutionalism independent
of liberal criteria. As illuminated by the Israeli experience, constitutionalism "is definitely not illiberal politics," he says, "but its conceptualization should not be
confined only to polities that embody an unambiguous,
robust commitment to the ends of liberal democracy"
(p. 237). I think his own remarkable argument suggests
that we go further still. He makes me wonder whether a
mixed constitution of the Israeli variety isn't in fact more
authentically constitutionalist than any of the unmixed
varieties which (like "liberal constitutionalism") do not
obstruct the despotism of their own principles.
University of Pennsylvania

GRAHAMWALKER

Decision Making in the European Community: The
Council Presidency and European Integration. By
Emil J. Kirchner. New York: St. Martin's, 1992. 165p.
$24.95 paper.
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The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on
European Union on 1 November, 1993 came after much
delay, including a razor-thin referendum vote in France
and two such votes (the second was to deal with an
initial rejection) in Denmark. The treaty has introduced
a new level of complexity (some would prefer to characterize it as a new level of confusion) into the nomenclature, decision-making process, institutional framework, and relations between Brussels and the national
governments of the 12 European Community member
states.
The European Union is now the umbrella term referring to the already-existing "three-pillar" structure of
the European Community (the European Coal and Steel
Community, European Economic Community, and European Atomic Energy Community) and the two new
"pillars" constructed by the Maastricht Treaty: the Com-
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mon Foreign and Security Policy enhancing the new
European Political Cooperation process and certain areas within the domains of the justice and interior ministries (especially greater collaboration/cooperation between police and other authorities on crime, terrorism,
and asylum-immigration issues). The European Community still continues to exist as a separate legal entity
within the broader framework of the Union; but, in view
of the difficulties of delineating what is strictly EC or
Union business, the term of choice is now the European
Union, rather than the more limited Community, as
contained in the title of this book.
Compounding this complexity, there exist two Councils: (1) the Council of Ministers of the European Union
(formerly "of the European Communities") comprising
(usually but not exclusively) the foreign affairs ministers
of the 12 member states and (2) the European Council,
comprising the heads of state or government of the
member states. The "ministerial" Council meets quite
regularly (about 80-90 times a year), whereas the
"prime-ministerial" Council meets at a biannual summit. Each Council has its "Presidency"-a rotating (sixmonth term) chief presidency officer or "President-inOffice."
At the level of the European Council, the head of state
or government of the member state holding this rotating
six-month office acts as host, chairs the meeting, sets the
agenda, acts as official spokesperson, and (depending
upon a series of conditions) may be able to set the tone
and nature of Union activities for the six months and
initiate various public policy proposals. At the level of
the Council of Ministers, the foreign minister (or another
portfolio, depending upon the specific agenda) of the
member state holding the rotating presidency plays a
leading role.
Emil J. Kirchner, Director of the Center for European
Studies at the University of Essex and a long-time
observer of European Community/Union politics, has
written a timely and important evaluation of the decision-making process at the level of these Council Presidencies and the offices' role in, and impact on, the
European integration process, the management of international cooperation, and institutional community
building.
The author, through a judicious use of archival material and personal interviewing, along with an analysis of
decision-making theory and the various theoretical approaches to political integration, examines how the
Council Presidencies impinge on the integration process, especially since the Single European Act and the
two 1991 Intergovernmental Conferences (on the European Monetary Union and European Political Union).
Assessing the balance and distribution of power between the actors at the Union and national levels, the
author consistently refers back to the basic question, Is
the Council Presidency primarily a device to maintain
and strengthen "national control" over decision making
within the European Union, or do the offices go beyond
national prerogatives and enhance integration?
The negotiations that led to the Single European Act
and the two Intergovernmental Conferences are interpreted by the author as requiring a new approach to, or
understanding of, the relationship between the Unionlevel institutions and the member states. The author
concludes that European Union decision making is not
solely a transfer of powers from the national capitals to
Brussels but also a sharing of competencies between

national and Union institutions and a "pooling of sovereignties" among the member states that evokes, at
least for me, the American phenomenon of "cooperative
federalism."
Kirchner has succeeded in presenting a most readable
assessment of the dynamics of European integration,
but this success has, in a sense, limited the book's
overall attractiveness. Decision Making in the European
Community is highly useful and informative to the professional well versed in the intricacies of the European
Union and to the advanced graduate student, but it is
not recommended for the general student, the public, or
as a text.
Cleveland State University

LEON HURWITZ

Party Policy and Government Coalitions. Edited by
M. J. Laver and Ian Budge. New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1992. 448p. $59.95.
Legislatures in the Policy Process: The Dilemmas of
Economic Policy. Edited by David Olson and Michael
Mezey. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
221p. $39.50.
The two volumes reviewed here report findings and
conclusions from ambitious research projects investigating aspects of policy making in a cross-national setting.
In both, the research emanates from on-going collaboration by international teams of scholars, the participants
individually expert in the politics of particular countries
and guided, collectively, by cross-national research
strategies. The editors lay out first the theoretical and
methodological approach of the research, followed by
applications in various national settings. They conclude
with a chapter summarizing results across cases. The
projects are differentiated both by institutional focus and
the role assigned to policy in the design of the research.
The Laver and Budge collection seeks to determine
whether "policy matters" in the decisions made by
parties to participate in the formation of governing
coalitions. In contrast, the Olson and Mezey anthology
explores ways in which legislatures may independently
influence the making of economic policy in institutional
contexts where political executives have become preeminent. The commitment to cross-national comparison
suggests that the goal of both projects is to establish
theoretical propositions by empirical generalization.
The projects depart from quite different theoretical
and methodological traditions. The Laver and Budge
work is rooted in three decades of formal and empirical
work investigating coalition processes and behavior.
While a certain mathematical elegance attaches to the
coalition theories that have been developed, attempts to
verify propositions empirically have generally produced
disappointing results. Laver and Budge argue that this
weakness stems from a general failure to take sufficient
account of contextual constraints in adapting theoretical
concepts for empirical testing. Thus they develop two
expectations regarding coalition behavior in cabinetforming contexts: that the motivation of actors (parties,
generally) is "policy seeking" rather than "office seeking," and the governments that form will be "policy
viable" (not constrained by numerical criteria). Drawing
upon cross-national longitudinal data coded from party
manifestoes and coalition policy declarations, a number
of hypotheses regarding these expectations are tested.
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